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Allegiance and Betrayal: British Residents in Russia during the Crimean War 
Simon Dixon 
This article reveals a previously unsuspected instance of a problem that has troubled most 
states at some point in their history: the treatment of foreigners in wartime following their 
transposition from the status of ‘resident alien’ to that of ‘enemy alien’. Debates on the rights 
of foreign residents, in contra-distinction to those of native citizens, can be traced back to the 
Athenian city state, where Aristotle himself was a Macedonian resident alien (metic).1 Wars 
may never have been the only crises to challenge those rights -- food shortages seem most 
often to have led to the expulsion of foreigners from ancient Rome and it remains uncertain 
whether it was Aristotle’s foreign status that twice forced him to leave Athens2 -- but, ever 
since classical times, foreign residents, variously defined, have repeatedly fallen under 
suspicion when their adopted homelands have come under threat from their native countries. 
More than 2000 years after Aristotle’s death, the issue remains current thanks partly to the 
controversial detention of noncitizens of the United States in the aftermath of the attacks of 
9/11.3 In studying the period between the ancient world and our own, historians have focused 
on the widespread introduction of mass internment during the First World War, a policy 
revived by leading belligerents between 1939 and 1945.4 Issued shortly after the Italian 
declaration of war in June 1940, Churchill’s notorious instruction to ‘collar the lot!’ is 
sometimes supposed to have heralded a uniform experience for Italian residents in Britain, 
most of whom had dual nationality. Yet some continued to serve in the British armed forces 
while others, especially women, faced a range of verbal and physical abuse as they struggled 
to sustain their family businesses in a hostile environment.5 Since the contested loyalties that 
resulted were no more a creation of the twentieth century than the question of how to handle 
foreign residents in wartime, the period before mass internment deserves greater attention. In 
detaining people of Japanese ancestry during the Second World War, the United States had 
recourse to the 1798 Alien Enemies Act, the only one of the four Alien and Sedition Acts 
introduced by the Federalist government of President John Adams to remain on the statute 
book in the twenty-first century. The first use of the term ‘alien enemy’ recorded by the 
Oxford English Dictionary dates from 1625, and the phenomenon itself was already 
implicitly understood in the late fourteenth century, when war with France led to the 
establishment of the principle that foreign residents ‘seeking the fullest expression of their 
rights should transfer their allegiance from the rulers of their natal lands and swear fealty to 
the Crown of England’.6 As we shall see, questions of allegiance were equally central to the 
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treatment of British residents in nineteenth-century Russia and to the conflict of loyalties 
experienced by many of them during the Crimean War.  
Since it was not until 1914 that the Russian government embarked on systematic 
sequestration and expulsion as part of a concerted attack on ‘enemy aliens’ -- a category 
which included Jews, Muslims and other minority populations in its own empire -- the fate of 
foreign residents in earlier conflicts has never been thoroughly investigated.7 While the 
Russian Old Believers were treated as fifth-columnists during the Crimean War, its impact on 
the Crimean Muslims is contested.8 And it is generally agreed that most British residents in 
Russia suffered little more than an intensified level of surveillance.9 Even some who 
occupied exposed positions survived unscathed. As sole agent of the British and Foreign 
Bible Society, the evangelical Scottish merchant Archibald Mirrielees was permitted to 
distribute his tracts not only to wounded Russian soldiers but also to British prisoners of 
war.10 Samuel Upton pursued his career as an architect in the Caucasus spa resorts even 
though his brother, William, a military engineer in Russian service, had been arrested by the 
British outside Sevastopol.11 Anxious to maintain the impression of normality, the tsarist 
government demonstrated its efforts to establish due title to the personal effects of even the 
poorest of intestate foreigners by continuing to send the Foreign Office records of the deaths 
of British residents.12 And just as friends reassured a tutor who had left St Petersburg in 1853 
that ‘the persons and property of British subjects’ had been ‘as religiously respected as those 
of Russian subjects now resident in England’, so members of the British community in 
Moscow later testified that Nicholas I had treated them with ‘almost fastidious delicacy’.13 
All this echoed the prevailing discourse in which Russians sought to challenge bitterly 
resented charges of barbarism while the British strove to enhance their status as the self-
appointed guardians of global civilization. In July 1854, when a visit to London by Count 
Nikolai von Pahlen prompted questions in parliament and the press about the intrusion of an 
‘alien enemy’, The Times reminded protesters that Pahlen had been a friend of that ‘arch 
traitor’, the duke of Wellington. Self-styled ‘patriots’ who attacked such a man had ‘no right 
to talk about civilized war at all’: ‘They don’t belong to the nineteenth century.’14  
While acknowledging that many British residents in Russia benefited from relative 
security during a war in which each side was anxious to be seen to behave with restraint, this 
article will focus on those who found both their property and their persons at risk. Striking in 
themselves, their experiences throw light on the wider question of treason, itself only one of 
the forms of betrayal that stemmed from the contrasting naturalization laws then in force in 
Russia and Britain. Because allegiance to a state and its monarch carried both rights and 
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duties, the article will discuss in turn the wartime diplomatic protection offered to British 
subjects in Russia and the obligations demanded by both sides of those who had become 
naturalized Russian subjects. Each of these issues came into sharp focus in February 1855, 
when the British government branded as traitors those naturalized British entrepreneurs in St 
Petersburg who contracted to manufacture engines for Russian warships and the Russian 
government refused to release their unwilling British artisans. However, since such questions 
are best considered in the context of earlier developments in the British community, the 
article begins with the shaping of allegiances in the reign of Nicholas I.15 
 
Pre-war allegiances: British residents in Russia, 1825-1854  
‘Foreigners’, confided General L.V. Dubelʹt to his commonplace book sometime in the 
1840s, ‘are the vermin which Russia warms with her sunshine, and burns them so that they 
crawl out to bite her’. But since Russia’s leading secret policeman thought that the most 
offensive thing about foreigners was their condescension -- ‘These scoundrel foreigners all 
think that they are better and cleverer than us’ -- he wanted Russia to exploit their expertise in 
order to match and outsmart them. That was why he supported orders for British marine 
engines, the naval hardware that later provoked the most controversial episode in the history 
of the British in Russia. Contradictions in the mind of ‘le général double’ were obvious to his 
contemporaries.16 It has taken historians longer to appreciate the extent to which, by 
representing a more widespread schizophrenia, they inadvertently helped to shape a series of 
foreign communities whose allegiances were no less complex. 
In April 1854, shortly after the outbreak of the Crimean War, Dubelʹt’s Third Section 
counted 904 ‘English’ residents in St Petersburg; in 1855 a further 453 were registered in 
Moscow, where they constituted 6.3 per cent of a foreign community dominated by 3635 
Germans. Taking into account the textile workers based in surrounding districts, it was 
estimated that approximately 1500 Britons lived in Moscow province at the end of the war.17 
Colonies of mill hands in the provinces of Vladimir and Tverʹ swelled the numbers further 
along with smaller enclaves and individuals scattered across the empire. There would surely 
have been more had Nicholas I not determined to tighten surveillance over foreigners through 
a stream of edicts implemented by provincial governors and co-ordinated by the Third 
Section.18 As so often, his instinct to control outweighed the need for independent initiative 
and Russia’s relative economic backwardness came partly to be blamed on the tsar’s 
restrictions on foreign entrepreneurs. Nevertheless, since such restrictions served to raise 
rewards in the sectors in highest demand, the possibility that the economy might have 
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performed better should not obscure the fact that a number of foreign settlers made their 
fortune in Russia. The Bremen cotton merchant Ludwig Knoop dominated the textile industry 
by linking British machine builders to the Russian entrepreneurs for whom he acted 
simultaneously as agent, technical adviser and banker.19 Thousands more calculated that 
whether as a result of financial opportunity, emotional ties or sheer desperation they were 
more likely to prosper in Russia than anywhere else. The British continued to play as varied a 
part in the influx as they had done since their community took root in the eighteenth 
century.20 As the wartime exodus showed, the kaleidoscopic range of their occupations 
included a former valet to the British Foreign Secretary, Lord Clarendon.21 Apart from the 
labourers, however, most were merchants, engineers, teachers or (less frequently noticed) 
horsemen. 
Though merchants were to be found from Archangel to Odessa, their hub was in St 
Petersburg, where several dynasties in the British Factory successfully diversified in the face 
of the faltering trade in Russian naval stores.22 In an under-monetized empire, credit had long 
been supplied largely by foreign merchants and one contemporary calculated that foreigners 
controlled no less than 97 per cent of Russia’s entire import and export trade in 1847.23 
Visiting Russia in that year, Cobden learned that the empire’s cotton mills were ‘as a rule 
either owned by or under the management of foreigners’ and managers, many of them 
British, could command up to £1000 a year. Such men were not easily cowed. When the 
manager at Giles Loder’s spinning mill addressed a dinner for 200 British merchants -- 
‘pretty much in the style of some of my old Chartist opponents in England’ -- Cobden was 
‘struck with the freedom of speech & absence of restraint which pervaded the meeting, & 
which contrasted with the timidity I had sometimes seen in Italy & Austria’.24  
Confidence came from prosperity. Of the forty-six British millionaires who died 
between 1870 and 1890, three were Rothschilds and two were Russia merchants: Loder 
himself bought a 10,241-acre English estate out of his profits from Nicholas I’s 
protectionism; the herring merchant William Miller sat as a Liberal M.P. between 1859 and 
1868.25 That was the year in which Charles Bell, partner in the St Petersburg finance house of 
Thomson Bonar through the 1840s and 1850s, was elected as a Conservative for the City of 
London.26 Since all deals involving Russia were stymied by the Crimean War -- in the debate 
on the Russian Government Securities Bill in August 1854, Palmerston made a point of 
declaring that it was ‘equally treasonable to advance money to the enemy in this country as in 
a foreign country’27 -- Bell returned to London, underlining his loyalty by sending Clarendon 
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occasional Russian intelligence.28 Miller remained in St Petersburg, communicating 
indirectly with the Foreign Office via a stream of letters from his brother, Alexander.29 
Whether they were employed by the state or in business for themselves, many 
engineers were engaged in potentially sensitive work, particularly at the Black Sea naval 
bases. Having escaped debts in Britain, John Upton took charge of dock construction at 
Sevastopol from 1832 until his death in 1851, the year in which new British machinery was 
installed at the naval rope factory at Nikolaev. British expertise had flourished there since the 
administration of Admiral A.S. Greig (1816-33), the only son of the hero of Chesme to 
become a Russian subject.30 Though the English superintendent of the arms factory at 
Ekaterinburg left when the Crimean War broke out, his counterpart at Tula, a naturalized 
Russian resident there for forty years, was still in post in summer 1854.31 The potential for 
rival allegiances is revealed by the contrasting wartime experiences of two entrepreneurs who 
will feature prominently in this article: Alfred Evans, who ran the Warsaw foundry and 
machine-works established in 1818 in partnership with his brothers Thomas and Douglas, and 
Francis Baird, who in 1843 inherited the celebrated St Petersburg conglomerate founded by 
his father, Charles, in 1792. The two first met at the time of Cobden’s visit in 1847, when 
Evans guided the railway engineer, Charles Vignoles, to meetings with Nicholas I and his 
ministers in order to secure the contract for a huge suspension bridge at Kiev.32 Baird 
entertained them on his steam-powered yacht and took them, as he took all his prized visitors, 
to see St Isaac’s cathedral, the greatest prestige project of the age, then under construction 
with multiple contributions from the Baird Works. During the Crimean War, their fates 
diverged: Evans, a British subject, was expelled from the tsarist empire in 1855, the year in 
which Baird, a naturalized Russian, was decorated for supplying machinery to the St 
Petersburg arsenal.33 
While it was possible for governesses to enter Russian society -- Julia Graves, whose 
brother was librarian to Count M.S. Vorontsov at Alupka in the Crimea, married the artist 
Ivan Aivazovskii in 184834 -- most led isolated lives, particularly if they were in service to a 
private family. By 1853, British governesses were sufficiently numerous in Moscow alone to 
prompt Rev. Christopher Grenside to warn the Russia Company that a married clergyman 
might more effectively counsel them on ‘the dangers and difficulties’ of their position.35 But 
this was partly a ruse to escape a congregation riven by increasingly rancorous disputes. 
Though some employers doubtless subjected their governesses to unwelcome advances, these 
young women and their male counterparts also faced challenges from bureaucrats anxious to 
limit their potential to undermine a regime legitimized by an official ideology for the first 
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time since the sixteenth century. After Count S.S. Uvarov launched his doctrine of 
‘Orthodoxy, autocracy and nationality’ in 1833, private tutors and governesses became one of 
several new semi-professional social groups, established by fiat in an attempt to align 
occupation with status and restricted by formal entrance qualifications.36 For those who 
persevered, the rewards were considerable. Lacking formal schooling, Percy [Boris 
Ivanovich] Beresford, the son of a London policeman, could hardly have anticipated a 
successful academic career. However, following his arrival in Warsaw in 1846, he graduated 
from tutorial positions in Volhynia province via a diploma from Kiev University to various 
posts in Kazanʹ, where in 1859 he published (in German) a treatise on French irregular verbs. 
Another privately educated Englishman, Henry-John [Genrikh-Fomich] Bishop, began his 
Russian career at the Naval Cadet Corps in St Petersburg, where he took the diploma that 
allowed him to teach briefly at Kazanʹ University. In December 1856, he became lector in 
English at the St Petersburg Theological Academy.37 Edward Tracy Turnerelli, an 
idiosyncratic Tory who later embarrassed Disraeli by proposing a People’s Tribute to him in 
1878, had also begun his career at Kazanʹ in 1837, returning to Britain in August 1854 as an 
overt Russophile.38 More modest individuals remained scattered across Russian provincial 
estates. British prisoners of war on the march to Voronezh in 1855 were surprised to be 
visited at Kharʹkov by ‘an Englishman named Aldridge, tutor in the family of a Russian 
nobleman … who [himself] spoke excellent English, and who greatly gratified us by bringing 
out a whole lot of the Illustrated London News, in which we saw pictures of all that had been 
going on in the Crimea’.39  
In fact, such landowners were a feature of the provinces south of Moscow, where they 
helped to inspire contemporary caricatures of the angloman.40 Some, like Semen Iakovlevich 
Unkovskii in Kaluga, ‘a passionate admirer of Dickens’, had seen service in the Royal Navy 
in the reign of Alexander I.41 Many more were fanatics of the horse racing introduced into 
Russia by Count Aleksei Orlov. Richard Walkden supplied English stallions to the imperial 
stud from 1820 to 1827, when he was succeeded by a fellow Lincolnshire man, John Ashton. 
A third northern dealer, John Jackson, active in Moscow since the turn of the century, was 
still a name to conjure with at the Howden horse fair at the outbreak of the Crimean War.42 
‘Mr Jackson has regularly drawn off to Russia some of the finest animals we produce’, the 
Foreign Secretary was warned in 1854, ‘to which, doubtless, may be ascribed the superior 
mounting of the Russian soldiers now opposed to ours’.43 By then, opportunities still existed 
for the jockeys, trainers and grooms who had first come to Russia more than fifty years 
earlier.44 Some may never have left their provincial stud-farms;45 others travelled to the 
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annual meetings in Moscow, Tsarskoe Selo and Lebedian, the small town in Tambov 
province where English was heard throughout the Crimean War at the hippodrome where 
racing officially began in 1827.46  
Many Britons shared the conceit that Nicholas I favoured their industriousness and 
political reliability, and it is true that in 1847, when the tsar had unusually good reason to 
suspect the German lands as a source of revolutionary contagion, the British were explicitly 
exempted from restrictions on the recruitment of foreign artisans and labourers.47 Such 
exceptions, however, are best regarded not as a symbol of national distinction but as a 
symptom of a regime that had traditionally conferred a hierarchy of socially differentiated 
privileges in return for services rendered. As Eric Lohr has shown, a similar culture applied 
to questions of allegiance from the time of Peter the Great: ‘Nearly every group entering the 
empire negotiated a “separate deal” with the tsar that created a mix of rights and obligations 
before the law and the Russian state that was distinct and different from the laws and rights 
pertaining to the tsar’s other subjects of similar social standing.’48 It is indicative of the 
intermediate status generated by naturalization in Russia -- half-way between foreigners and 
native subjects -- that the most important shared characteristic of these ‘deals’ allowed 
naturalized Russians to relinquish their claim to Russian nationality, on payment of duties 
and completion of a tortuous bureaucratic procedure, and to return to their native lands.49 
Some 11 per cent of the British residents in St Petersburg in 1854 were recorded as 
Russian subjects, a figure higher than the average between 1839 and 1863, when the annual 
rate of official naturalizations in the empire hovered between 5 per cent and 10 per cent of net 
immigration.50 One motive for naturalization under Nicholas I was his restriction of 
inheritance rights for those who spurned it.51 Another was the fact that only Russian subjects 
were permitted to trade on the domestic market. This helps to explain why there were so few 
firms ‘of British Merchants (solely & strictly such)’ -- by one estimate ‘probably not more 
than 20 in the whole Empire’ in 1854.52 More positively, those who acquired noble status by 
becoming Russian subjects could anticipate not only a greater degree of social acceptance 
than most of them would have achieved in Britain, but a greater degree of integration than 
most naturalized subjects achieved anywhere in Europe.53 The temptation to those from 
relatively humble backgrounds is obvious. A case in point was Edward Harvey [Eduard 
Vasilʹevich Garve], scion of a modest Essex family, who lost his father when young and 
moved to Russia with his elder brother as a youth, having taken up with Alexander I’s 
entourage in London in 1814. By teaching English at Moscow University and the Moscow 
Commercial School from the late 1820s, Harvey acquired the right to nobility through service 
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and became a Russian subject in 1851 in order to register with the heralds. Harvey 
exemplifies Lohr’s instinct that the decision to naturalize was often dominated by social 
motives, though it is sometimes hard to disentangle the balance between individual ambition 
and a desire to please a state that had rewarded settlers well and was anxious to enrol all its 
subjects in the soslovie system.54 
Overt pressure to naturalize remained low, not least because its implications were 
serious. Consider the edict of 1844 which amended the oath of loyal service taken by 
foreigners who entered Russian state employment without becoming subjects of the tsar. 
They were no longer obliged to pledge fealty ‘to their true and native Sovereign’ (svoemu 
istinnomu i prirodnomu Gosudariu) because this phrase, ‘relating exclusively to Russian 
subjects, cannot be applied to subjects of other states’.55 While the amendment confirms 
Russia’s flexibility in the search for foreign talent, it also highlights the uniqueness of a 
subject’s status. Even in the twenty-first century, when citizenship is measured in terms of 
impersonal statehood, dual nationality remains controversial.56 At a time when political 
loyalties in both Britain and Russia remained intensely personal, it was inconceivable to take 
an oath of equal standing to two sovereigns simultaneously. Naturalization as a Russian 
subject might only have been temporary and partial, but, for so long as it lasted, Russian law 
regarded the commitment as unconditional. This was to have significant consequences during 
the Crimean War, when contradictions with British assumptions were rapidly exposed. 
English law, as retrospectively systematized between the 1840s and 1860s, regarded 
as a British subject every child born within the dominions of the Crown, whatever the 
nationality of its parents. Strictly interpreted, as Andreas Fahrmeir notes, this ius soli would 
have made aliens out of all British subjects’ children born abroad.57 Even a less draconian 
gloss proved hard to apply. In 1859, the Home Office warned that any general issue of 
certificates of nationality by the British consul in Moscow would be ‘very inconvenient’ 
since ‘the child of an Englishman born abroad is not a British Subject, unless born in 
wedlock, which introduces a vast variety of difficult questions’.58 In wartime, however, 
attention was focused not on the acquisition of British nationality but on its inalienability. 
The Russian government was told in July 1854 that ‘the abandonment by a British subject of 
his national character is not contemplated as possible by the English Law -- any act which 
may be done in furtherance of such an object is considered null & void’.59 While such a 
verdict evidently posed difficulties for naturalized Russian subjects, others were also 
troubled. Perturbed by rumours that the British government would regard as traitors any 
British subjects who continued to serve the Russian state, a university professor asked his 
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sister to seek clarification. The Foreign Office confirmed that although it would be 
treasonable to remain in the military, naval or civil service of a state at war with Britain, the 
professor had nothing to fear: ‘Civilized Nations do not make war against Literature or 
Science, nor do they desire to prevent their progress even in the Country of an Enemy.’60  
 
Rights: British residents under pressure, 1854-1856 
By stressing the permanence of British nationality, the British government intended to 
highlight not only its subjects’ obligations, but also their rights to diplomatic protection. 
Following the abrupt departure of the ambassador, Sir Hamilton Seymour, on 10/22 February 
1854, British consuls were intended to remain in Russia. But when the consuls, too, were 
jointly withdrawn in April, British residents were placed under the care of the Danish 
ambassador in St Petersburg.61 Having married a Gagarin, Baron Otto von Plessen boasted 
impeccable social connections; Nesselrode was said to regard him as his own son. But such 
intimacy with the enemy raised doubts in British minds about a diplomat to whom Russian 
defeat was unthinkable. Since the Danish envoy in London, Count V.T. Oxholm, also 
admired Russia -- and, like Plessen, survived the replacement in December 1854 of the 
conservative Ørsted-Bluhme administration by a Liberal government led by Peter Bang and 
Ludvig Scheele -- the Foreign Office never fully overcame its suspicions about Danish 
neutrality.62 It was presumably to counter such concerns that successive foreign ministers in 
Copenhagen forwarded to the British ambassador, Andrew Buchanan, not only copies of 
Plessen’s despatches, but also the most significant original communications from L.G. 
Seniavin, Nesselrode’s deputy at the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs between 1850 and 
1856, who corresponded privately with Plessen rather than on official notepaper.63 
For closer acquaintance with the British community, Clarendon urged Plessen to 
consult Dr Edward Law, chaplain to the British Factory in St Petersburg between 1820 and 
1864. The baron needed no encouragement. Though the congregation on the English 
Embankment struck most outsiders as hermetically sealed, its minister was well connected. 
Nesselrode, a nominal Anglican born in Lisbon of German descent, famously took his annual 
communion from Law, a nephew of Lord Ellenborough sufficiently at ease in society to give 
English tuition to the Imperial family.64 Law in turn relied on Grenside’s successor, Rev. 
William Gray, appointed by the Russia Company in November 1853 in preference to Rev. 
Howell Phillips, an avowed admirer of Nicholas I. By February 1854, Gray was already 
settling into the quasi-consular duties traditionally performed by the Anglican chaplain in 
Moscow, where there was no British consul until after the Crimean War.65 
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Gray himself soon required Danish assistance, having provoked the Russian 
authorities by praying that the queen might be granted ‘victory over all Her enemies’. As 
Plessen drily remarked, the chaplain’s explanation that the enemies in question were purely 
spiritual and internal was unlikely to impress Moscow’s governor-general, A.A. Zakrevskii, 
‘who is known as a man of very plain speech’.66 To the relief of Gray’s family, Plessen 
settled matters confidentially and services continued uncensored.67 After all, similar prayers 
were offered in Russian palace chapels, where the young lady-in-waiting, Anna Tiutcheva, 
‘experienced a certain satisfaction at the sight of foreign princes … praying to God to deliver 
us from our enemies, with whom the majority of them are secretly allied’.68 Neither was this 
the only incidence of low comedy. A British merchant ‘party of pleasure’ was rapidly 
released after crossing the Russian border near Memel (present-day Klaipeda in Lithuania) 
equipped with ‘many bottles of champagne’ but no passports, and in the company of two 
Prussian ‘songstresses’.69 Plessen’s services proved to be equally unnecessary for the 
superintendent of the Mosolov stud in Moscow province. Ivan Golovin, an outspoken critic 
of Nicholas I naturalized as a British subject in 1846, told Clarendon that the trainer had been 
exiled to Siberia for destroying a bust of the tsar in revenge for Russian press criticism of the 
queen.70 However, it emerged on investigation that a local court had accepted that the bust 
had been accidentally smashed by his nephew, the groom Thomas Day, during a drunken 
scuffle with lads at a rival stable. Both men were unmolested and had left Moscow merely in 
order to attend the races at Tsarskoe Selo and Lebedian.71 
British residents nevertheless had reason for anxiety in the early months of the war. 
The Russian press bristled with alarmist news from London; a quantity of anglophobic verse 
appeared in the semi-official Severnaia pchela; pamphleteers vilified Palmerston, renowned 
for his hostility towards Russia, and Vice-Admiral Sir Charles Napier, the commander of the 
British fleet in the Baltic which threatened Kronstadt after storming Bomarsund.72 When 
Napier’s squadron appeared off Kronstadt in mid-June 1854, the excited imperial family 
drove out to see it -- in an English coach and four.73 Beyond this royal picnic, the atmosphere 
was not so light-hearted. In anticipation of Napier’s descent, British residents had been 
banned from their estates on the Gulf of Finland -- ‘I would have banned them […] from the 
whole of Russia’, snorted Dubelʹt -- and public opinion remained hostile even once the threat 
of invasion had evaporated.74 Though few Britons were denounced to the Third Section, 
many were subjected to hurtful slights. Rebecca McCoy, a domestic teacher of English who 
epitomized the condescending attitudes that so enraged Dubelʹt, acknowledged that when war 
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came even her Russian friends would ‘just as readily have touched a toad as have shaken 
hands with an English person’.75 
Foreseeing trouble when war was declared, some, like Miss McCoy, set off to 
England overland via Moscow, Warsaw and Berlin; others tried to charter a ship, only to find 
that Nesselrode refused to allow a neutral vessel to enter Kronstadt. British residents there 
were obliged to move when all private houses were commandeered as Russian billets.76 Still, 
there was no reason to panic since both sides adhered to the convention by which each 
guaranteed the safety and protection of the other’s domiciles. ‘Such protection and safety’, 
ran the official Russian declaration, ‘both as regards them personally and also the property 
belonging to them, will in Russia, without exception and to whatever class [zvanie] they may 
belong, be fully enjoyed by all subjects of Great Britain and of France who, peacefully 
following their occupations, observe the existing laws and abstain from acts which those laws 
forbid’.77 Vexed to learn shortly after this announcement that even their own ambassador’s 
possessions had nevertheless apparently been impounded, the Foreign Office summoned the 
departing Russian consul for a formal protest at the end of April 1854.78 With time, however, 
the mood became calmer. News reached London from Warsaw in August that although all 
British subjects were under surveillance, its impact was slight: ‘As for ourselves personally, 
and for our own workmen, we are obliged to show ourselves only twice a week at the police 
office; and this not, perhaps, so great an annoyance, all things considered, as we might have 
expected in a state of war.’79 For one group, in particular, this proved to be merely a lull 
before the storm. Though it had been established in Warsaw for thirty-three years and some 
of its members were Russian subjects, the mission of the London Society for Promoting 
Christianity among the Jews was expelled in December 1854, not to reopen until 1875.80 
Most British residents nevertheless had time to weigh the hazards of remaining in Russia 
against the risks of abandoning their livelihoods and property.81  
For many immiserated labourers, this was Hobson’s choice: without financial support, 
repatriation was scarcely a viable option. In July 1854, William Miller offered to charter a 
vessel for the ‘numerous English’ who had ‘been thrown out of employment’ in St 
Petersburg.82 But although the British government guaranteed such a ship safe passage 
provided it carried nothing except British subjects, the allied blockade prevented any Russian 
vessel from returning to Kronstadt.83 Problems were equally acute in Moscow, from where 
Gray repeatedly urged the Russia Company to press the government to fund ‘the poor English 
who are unable to return home without assistance’. Over the previous six months, he reported 
in February 1855, his congregation had donated 960 silver roubles for this purpose and ‘could 
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not be expected to continue so large an expenditure’.84 Since the British government, alone 
among its European counterparts, was prepared to fund the return of destitute subjects, 
Clarendon unhesitatingly offered relief, being delayed only by the Company’s failure to 
estimate the number of deserving cases.85 Matters stalled until June, when he read Gray’s 
plea on behalf of Henry Nuttell, a Rochdale artisan resident in Russia since 1848 but 
dependent on charity for a year following the collapse of his employer’s business. ‘He has a 
wife and 2 children of the ages, respectively, of about 8 & 10 years.’86 The Treasury not only 
granted Nuttell’s travel expenses, estimated at between £35 and £45, but also ruled that the 
‘peculiar difficulties’ experienced by British residents at Moscow, made it ‘the duty of the 
Home Government to act liberally towards them’ by refunding their 960 roubles.87 Thus 
encouraged, Gray raised further cases, all of which were approved by the Foreign Secretary. 
Indeed, when the Treasury baulked at subsidizing two ‘young unmarried men in the prime of 
life’, Clarendon insisted that the government must help all the destitute, regardless of age or 
marital status, not least because it was ‘desirable that a good mechanic should not remain in 
Russia where he may be compelled by want to work for the Russian Govt’.88 
A more prosperous individual had unexpectedly chosen to do so, even when offered 
diplomatic protection. This was the twenty-seven-year-old engineer, William Crichton, a 
native of Leith who had been employed since 1850 at the Åbo shipyard owned by his fellow 
Scot, David Cowie.89 Assured that there would be no obstacle to his return to Britain in May 
1854, Crichton duly applied for a passport only to be arrested by Finnish police who 
mistakenly extended to him a measure intended to apply to British engineers in Russian state 
employment. Escorted to St Petersburg, he was threatened with detention in Moscow and 
released thanks only to the intervention of his great uncle, Sir William Crichton, a retired 
doctor to the imperial family whose own uncle had led medical reforms under Alexander I.90 
Interviewed by Plessen, young Crichton revealed that although he believed that a passport 
would not now be refused, he nevertheless intended to remain in St Petersburg, where an 
opportunity had arisen under the Engineer General, Alexander Wilson, director of the Izhora 
state foundry at Kolpino.91 Crichton was careful not to say (what Plessen probably knew) that 
Wilson, a naturalized Russian subject aged almost eighty, had been commissioned to 
manufacture marine engines to replace lost British orders, a task widely believed to be 
beyond his factory’s capacity.92 Neither did he mention that Wilson’s need was urgent since 
his long-serving deputy, James Johnston, had returned to Scotland in a fanfare of publicity 
rather than accept promotion to Kronstadt and become a Russian subject.93 All Crichton 
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confirmed from the sanctuary of Sir William’s Pavlovsk estate was that ‘in the mean time’ he 
wished no further steps to be taken.94  
Those unable to rely on such exalted patronage experienced a more delicate dilemma. 
Matilda Peskett, governess to the family of the governor of Minsk, sought to leave when war 
broke out and was referred to Plessen when difficulties arose; James Stuart Rees, tutor to the 
family of Count A.F. Orlov, Benckendorff’s successor at the Third Section, was presumably 
relieved to be placed under the baron’s protection after asking Clarendon for the impossible: 
a passport permitting him to remain in Russia, but to return to Britain whenever he wished.95 
Doubtless many would have liked to hedge their bets in this way. The Russian government 
discouraged them from doing so by confirming in January 1855 the only exceptional measure 
it claimed to have taken with respect to British rights. This was the stipulation that no British 
subject who left Russia during the war should be allowed to return until hostilities had 
ceased.96 Since the length of the conflict was no more predictable than the security of estates 
left vacant by absentee foreign owners, the balance of interests for those with significant 
investments militated in favour of standing their ground. 
The risks of leaving property unoccupied were discovered by Alexander Bower St 
Clair, whom Palmerston had recommended to Clarendon as war loomed on grounds of his 
‘curious & encouraging’ intelligence about ‘the intense Discontent’ in Russia’s Polish 
provinces.97 Trusting that war would reduce the tsar’s dominions ‘to Dimensions more 
compatible with the Repose of Europe’ -- and convinced that the Polish-Lithuanian lands 
could be ‘conveniently’ annexed to Prussia -- Palmerston credited St Clair as an authoritative 
source in view of his long residence at Vepriai (Wieprże), the estate in Kovno province 
belonging to his wife, Countess Pelagia Kossakowska. Following their marriage at Florence 
in 1834, the couple had eventually settled in Lithuania, where St Clair financed a steam-
powered flour mill at Kovno, engineered by a fellow Scot, Alexander Lawrie.98 However, 
while the St Clairs were attending their son’s passing out parade at Sandhurst, both estate and 
mill were sequestered. No permanent confiscation was intended, Seniavin assured Plessen in 
May 1855, but the precaution was necessary because Kossakowska had left the empire on a 
British passport without completing the formalities required of a Russian landowner, while St 
Clair had distributed ‘seditious writings’ and ‘assisted in the transmission of an improper 
correspondence with persons residing abroad’.99 ‘With so much at stake’, St Clair objected, 
‘to be guilty of the offences imputed to me would be madness’. But since he had been 
recommended to Palmerston by Prince Adam Czartoryski, the protest sounds hollow: St 
Clair’s letters to Clarendon reveal him as an unabashed advocate of Polish liberties.100 
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Thanks to Plessen, Kossakowska was eventually permitted to return to Lithuania, where, to 
her husband’s disgust, she was initially confined to Vilna. But when peace was declared, 
Seniavin proved as good as his word, even if there was a sting in the tail. St Clair reported 
that Vepriai had been restored to his wife on condition that she sold it before 23 October 1856 
‘and that neither herself or family including myself, ever return to Russia’. The Kovno flour 
mill was also threatened with a forced sale, a more troubling prospect since its value had 
allegedly declined thanks to police neglect.101 Clarendon thought sufficiently highly of St 
Clair to raise his case privately during the Paris treaty negotiations, but neither he nor Lord 
Wodehouse, British ambassador in St Petersburg from June 1856, succeeded in gaining 
compensation. 
The most vulnerable Britons in Russia were naturally those who had worked in the 
defence industries. Using the Kronstadt chaplain as his courier, R.S. Thompson, a young 
engineer on a civil steamer, smuggled out sketches of mines intended for Kronstadt harbour 
and volunteered for the British fleet in April 1854. Keen to ‘get him out’, Clarendon offered 
to pay his expenses. But Thompson, who reached Berlin on 5 June, consented to enlist only 
when assured of the safety of his mother and father, his ship’s chief engineer, and of the 
state-employed engineers then trying to leave Russia.102 On 24 June, the Times published a 
lurid account of their ‘escape’, claiming that all manner of ‘subterfuge’ had prevented them 
from receiving passports within the promised eight days.103 Although a partial retraction was 
issued when the engineer closest to the tsar denied that their departure had been blocked, the 
paper proved accurate in its prediction that those who remained in Russia would find it hard 
to leave.104 Edmund Collins and Thomas Edmond, who plied the Circassian coast out of 
Kerch with the Black Sea fleet, were among those detained under the regulations that 
inadvertently led to Crichton’s arrest. Under contract until 1856, Edmond had resigned at the 
outbreak of war but had been obliged to complete four months’ notice. Finally presented with 
a passport via St Petersburg in August 1854, he was arrested there and escorted back to 
Moscow, ‘for why and for what he did not know’. Since then, his wife told the Foreign Office 
in December: 
a Mr Rees has arrived from St Petersburg and informed me that my husband stood 
from the morning he left St Petersburg for Moscow under the surveillance of the 
Genddearmes and that a Court informed him the Emperiors Reasons for detaining him 
where simply these that all the Engineers, that had been sent home had joined the 
English Fleet and gone out against him, and my husband being acquainted with every 
corner of the Black Sea would imediatly come here and do the same thing.105 
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The intelligence proved more accurate than the spelling. When Plessen requested that 
Edmond and Collins be permitted to leave Russia or paid their full salary, release was refused 
on the ground that their knowledge of Russian military affairs might enable them to transmit 
sensitive information to the enemy (as indeed some returning engineers intended to do).106 
Seniavin defended the halving of their pay to £10 per month not only as ‘amply sufficient for 
their comfortable maintenance’107 but as all they could rightfully claim because they were at 
liberty to seek employment in any Moscow manufactory.108 Plessen’s warning that it would 
be futile to persist prompted Clarendon to complain to Oxholm of a breach of trust: according 
to the governments’ agreement in 1854, ‘justice would require’ that both men be granted 
either their money or their freedom.109 By late July 1855, both had been released and Collins 
was back in Greenwich, petitioning the Russian government for his salary arrears -- a claim 
Plessen had some hope of satisfying in November.110 
He had not, however, been able to secure the release of William Whitworth, an 
engineer for the past decade at Nikolaev, where most of the Black Sea fleet was built.111  
Whitworth had inherited the Congregationalist sense of propriety that led his father, Nicholas, 
to both bankruptcy and imprisonment as a result of anti-corruption campaigns in Lancashire 
and Ireland and ultimately underpinned a dynasty of Liberal politicians. In 1865, William’s 
brother Benjamin became M.P. for Drogheda, where the family had settled after moving 
briefly to the United States, but it was to Nicholas’s third son, Robert, a successful 
Manchester businessman, that William wrote from Zhitomir in June 1855.112 Since the 
Russian Government ‘were bound at the expiration of my contract to give me a passport to 
return home with’, William explained, he had ‘waited with the utmost impatience the 
moment when [he] could lawfully demand it’. When that moment came, in February 1855, he 
reluctantly embarked, with his wife and four children, on ‘a most miserable, expensive and 
dangerous journey’ to Zhitomir, following assurances from the military governor of Nikolaev 
that he would be granted a passport after eight days. Though an inspection of his possessions 
by the Nikolaev police had uncovered nothing untoward, the governor-general of Kiev 
determined to consult the head of the Naval Ministry, the Grand Duke Konstantin 
Nikolaevich, who forbade Whitworth’s return to Britain on grounds of his specialist 
expertise. After three months in Zhitomir, he was ordered ‘to leave immediately for Moscow 
there to remain’:   
There is no reason given for this most unjust and to me astounding resolution. They 
however inform me that if I will not leave of my own accord for Moscow they will 
forward me with my family there accompanied by an officer of the Police. Not 
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wishing to go through the Country like a thief, I have stated that in a few days I will 
leave here for Moscow in obedience to their orders.113 
Whitworth’s petition to the Grand Duke was naturally fruitless (it would be different, he 
believed, if the tsar were to hear of his plight). He had contacted the Danish ambassador: 
‘what will be the result God only knows’.114 Now he beseeched his brother to appeal to 
Clarendon: ‘Say that I am detained against my will, and compelled to spend the little money I 
have in travelling about Russia without any reason being given for it. It can only be done 
either to ruin me or to compel me to serve them -- they will not succeed for as long as they 
are at war with old England nothing shall induce me to serve them directly or indirectly.’ The 
plea, however, was in vain. Following the fall of Sevastopol on 8 September 1855, the 
Russians were seen to be anxious ‘to diminish the loss they have sustained in the eyes of the 
nation by representing the greater importance of Nicolaieff as a Naval Port and arsenal’.115 
Grand Duke Konstantin celebrated his twenty-eighth birthday there on 9/21 September at the 
start of a two-month visit to supervise renovations that were inspected by the tsar himself.116 
In the circumstances, Whitworth’s detention was inevitably prolonged: he remained confined 
to Moscow until after the end of the war. 
A British subject with more to lose was Alfred Evans, ordered to leave the Russian 
empire after refusing to take the oath of loyalty to the tsar. Seniavin reported that Evans had 
been expelled ‘because he had shown his enmity to the Government both by his conduct and 
his language’, a plausible enough claim in the light of Evans’s subsequent revelations to St 
Clair about Russian troop movements near his Radom estate. Buchanan, however, learned 
that the ‘real reason’ was that Evans had ‘refused to manufacture implements of War for the 
use of the Russian Government’.117 It was all too much for the bluff ambassador, aptly 
characterized by Colin Matthew as one of the ‘shire horses’ of the Victorian diplomatic 
service.118 Declaring Evans’s refusal to supply arms to the enemy ‘very proper’, and thinking 
it ‘unjust to expect’ that his ‘language in the circle of his friends, should be favourable to the 
cause of a Country at war with Gt Britain’, Buchanan complained to the Danes, without 
consulting Clarendon, that ‘if the Russian Govt consider wishes expressed for the success of 
H.M. arms a sufficient cause for the expulsion of the subjects of the Queen from the 
dominions of the Emperor, there are probably few Englishmen in Russia who have not 
rendered themselves liable to be expelled’.119 In conveying such sentiments to Nesselrode, 
Plessen presumably thought discretion the better part of valour. But it made no difference. 
Notwithstanding Buchanan’s ‘repeated remonstrances’, Seniavin promptly confirmed St 
Petersburg’s refusal to rescind a decision taken ‘par de graves motifs’.120 
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Obligations: treason and betrayal 
By the time that the British government took up Evans’ cause, the question of treason had 
been highlighted by an Order in Council of 8 February 1855. Based on information from 
Russia, this warned that those who supplied military matériel to the queen’s enemies were 
‘liable to be apprehended and dealt with as traitors’.121 The most likely source of the 
intelligence, Alexander Miller, had advocated in August 1854 a proclamation ‘warning 
British subjects that it is illegal (if not high treason) to carry on either import or export trade 
with Russia while we are at war with her’. However, although he informed Clarendon on 3 
February 1855 that the tsarist government was absorbed in military preparations, his letter 
made no mention of the gunboat construction that prompted the Order in Council.122 
Moreover, as the characteristically well-informed Economist reported, that was a measure 
directed not at profiteers in Britain, but at the ‘three or four’ British entrepreneurs in St 
Petersburg to whom the tsar had ‘lately advanced a considerable sum of money to enlarge 
their premises, on condition that they shall cast and prepare large engines for war 
steamers’.123 Though the paper mentioned no names, one of these men was Francis Baird. 
‘As Mr. Baird is a naturalised Russian subject’, Robert Harrison tartly observed, ‘and of a 
rank which enables him to hold serfs, we ought perhaps to moderate our surprise at the 
circumstances of his having undertaken contracts with the Russian Government, which in 
time of war no man calling himself an Englishman should have undertaken’.124 On 15/27 
February, Dubelʹt noted that two more British firms -- Thomson-Isherwood and Ashford & 
Stevens -- both of which had contracted to manufacture engines for Russian gunboats, had 
reneged in the light of the queen’s proclamation. ‘They have been told that if they are not 
prepared to work, they will be subject to the full force of the laws, which they gave their 
signatures to obey.’125  
Though they affected to be affronted by the proclamation, Russian ministers had little 
cause for surprise about its contents. When Russia went to war with the Ottomans in October 
1853, Nesselrode had been instructed to ask the Foreign Office whether orders placed for 
British iron bridges on the Moscow-Warsaw railway would be fulfilled in the event of a 
rupture between the two powers.126 It had been a key (if unachievable) aim of the Aberdeen 
Coalition to prevent the export of marine engines to Russia even before Britain declared 
war.127 The opening of hostilities was followed in April 1854 by well-publicized seizures on 
the Thames and the Clyde, resented by the manufacturers but legitimized by a Royal 
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Commission in November; to St Petersburg’s embarrassment, vessels laid down for the 
Russian navy were commandeered as British corvettes.128 
The significance of the February proclamation lay not so much in its content as in its 
timing. Though Palmerston’s role in it is unclear, it was issued two days after he kissed hands 
as prime minister and symbolized to the Russian government all their longstanding 
reservations about the new premier. By coincidence, news of it reached them shortly after the 
promulgation of Nicholas I’s manifesto on the formation of local militias, a defensive 
measure designed to revive memories of the partisans of 1812 that was less warmly received 
than the government had hoped.129 A sense of national crisis was intensified when the tsar fell 
ill and died within a fortnight. Rumours that the nobility had secretly pressed his successor to 
abandon the militia prompted the Holy Synod to issue a call to arms, proclaimed in all 
churches on 7/19 March.130 Since Alexander II was equally committed to a new bout of naval 
construction -- begun in January 1855, co-ordinated by N.I. Putilov under the direction of 
Grand Duke Konstantin Nikolaevich, and designed to compensate for lost British orders -- 
the authorities could hardly tolerate errant British-owned foundries. St Petersburg’s military 
governor decreed that not only their naturalized owners, but each individual employee must 
sign a statement confirming his commitment to contractual obligations to the Russian 
government on pain of exile to the interior.131  
It was this apparent persecution of a vulnerable workforce that prompted Clarendon to 
intervene in late April, prompted by a despatch from Lord Bloomfield, his ambassador in 
Berlin, who had served in St Petersburg between 1839 and 1851 and remained close to 
William Miller, among others. Bloomfield reported that the majority of British subjects 
employed in arms manufacture, having learned of the queen’s proclamation long before they 
saw the copies he had forwarded to Russia, ‘either threw up their employments or gave notice 
to their employers that they must quit’: 
Many of these men, particularly those who have families, have made great sacrifices 
for they were earning from Twenty Five to Thirty Pounds per month, and can find no 
employment at all, as there is not a single forge or foundry in the neighbourhood of St 
Petersburgh where articles of a warlike kind are not being made at this moment, and 
there is a general complaint among them that H[er] M[ajesty’s] G[overnment] ought 
to have published the Proclamation at the breaking out of the War, when they would 
have got out of their engagements whereas now the Imperial Government refuse to let 
some of them leave Russia, and they must therefore either starve or become traitors to 
Their Country.132 
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Though the Foreign Secretary determined to rescue all those placed in this invidious position, 
it was harder for Plessen to plead on behalf of a lowly social group than on behalf of a few 
individuals.133 At first, he apparently made no attempt to do so. In May, he reported only that 
Seniavin had yet to respond to his request for passports for two British artisans, and that a 
further request -- made at the instigation of Dr Law for a passport for Francis Baird’s cousin, 
Charles -- had been refused. As Clarendon already knew from Bloomfield, Charles Baird, 
manager of the Baird Works since the mid-1840s, had been charged with inciting its 
employees to strike. Even if the accusation was unfounded, Plessen believed that Baird faced 
insuperable ‘prejudices’, despite influential support for him in the capital.134  
Though the British government cared little for the Bairds, the impulse to repatriate 
their foremen was intensified when a second abortive allied offensive in the Baltic confirmed 
the momentum of Russian naval development. When the tsar sailed to see Napier’s squadron 
at anchor on 11/23 June 1855 -- a more melancholy excursion than the previous year’s picnic 
at Bronnaia gora -- ‘the imperial yacht passed through a line of completely new gunboats’. 
‘Last year’, Tiutcheva boasted, ‘the Russian fleet had not a single one: now it has 60 of them 
thanks to the efforts of Grand Duke Constantine who allegedly paid for the construction of a 
significant proportion of them out of his own fortune’.135 The grand duke’s mentor, A.V. 
Golovin, put the figure at 40 vessels.136 In fact, as the Naval Ministry subsequently 
confirmed, 32 gunboats had been commissioned in January 1855 and Baird, Thomson, and 
Ashford & Stevens had all contributed to the delivery of 23 engines and 26 boilers by 15 
May.137 So Alexander Miller was largely accurate in reporting on 11 July that the Russians 
had contracted for 36 gunboats (the scale of the subsequent order) and that 21 of them had 
been finished by the beginning of June.138 When Bloomfield’s successor in Berlin reminded 
Clarendon on 1 September that several of Baird’s employees were still ‘forcibly detained and 
compelled to work under a threat of being sent as Prisoners into the interior’, Plessen was 
instructed to renew his efforts, this time on behalf of eight British artisans.139 Again he failed. 
Considering the threat of internment real, the baron warned that further intervention would be 
counterproductive: while the Russian government would have allowed the men to depart at 
the start of the war, it regarded their decision to stay as irrevocable and dismissed the 
February proclamation as a provocation. Clarendon reluctantly accepted this advice, 
bemoaning ‘fresh proof of the little reliance which can be placed on Russian assurances’ and 
insisting ‘that the Queen’s proclamation, even if it had been a provocation to Russia, which it 
was not, would afford no pretext for the violation of an engagement’ or for reducing Baird’s 
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workforce ‘to the condition of Slaves, as they are compelled to work against their will, & 
against their allegiance under fear of punishment’.140 
Notwithstanding such emotive language, it was not only tsarist actions that raised 
questions of treason for British residents in Russia. The case of William Upton proves that 
they could be treated just as ruthlessly by their own government.141 In the 1840s, Upton had 
assisted his father in the Sevastopol dockyard and emulated him by taking the oath to 
Nicholas I in 1850. On the death of John Upton in the following year, William briefly 
succeeded him in charge of the Sevastopol Dock Committee. But when that body was 
disbanded in 1852, he was discharged with the rank of colonel and granted a suburban estate 
and vineyard.142 It was from there on 17 September 1854 that he and his family witnessed the 
approach of the allied fleet that was to overturn their lives. Within ten days, Upton was a 
prisoner of Lord Raglan’s invading army, escorted to his headquarters by Raglan’s military 
secretary, Lt. Col. Steele, and Lt. Gen. Sir Richard Airey, the Quarter-Master General. 
Questions of allegiance immediately arose. When Upton explained to his captors the terms on 
which he had become a Russian subject, Steele asked ‘whether I had obtained the permission 
of the Queen to take this step, and on ascertaining that I had not, he told me that they should 
consider me as an English subject, treat me as such, and expect me to give such information 
as lay in my power’. Nevertheless, if Upton could provide information leading to the capture 
of Sevastopol, ‘they would guarantee that I should be remunerated for any losses I might 
sustain by compromising myself with the Russian Government as being a Russian subject’.143  
It did not work out that way. Though permitted to safeguard his family and some 
possessions, Upton was detained at Balaklava, where he was employed in correcting the 
defective plans of Sevastopol brought to the Crimea by British military engineers. Ironically, 
it was local knowledge that caused his downfall. Taken by Airey and Lt. General George de 
Lacy Evans to the heights of Inkerman on 25 October -- the day before the first Russian sortie 
leading to the battle on 5 November -- he was asked whether a road existed between there 
and the roads which supplied Sevastopol. Upton said he knew of no such road and thought it 
unlikely that one could be built in view of the profusion of bogs and ravines along the coast. 
When it transpired that the Russians had not only made a road but used it to defend 
Sevastopol from Raglan’s attack, Upton was accused of supplying false information and 
refused compensation for the loss of his property, valued by him at £4527 in December 1854. 
Not until the following March did a military Board of Enquiry award him £500, an offer he 
refused. He remained a prisoner of war in the Crimea until May 1855, when he was permitted 
to return to England on the intervention of Lord Kinnaird, whose brother, Arthur, had served 
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in the British Embassy at St Petersburg between 1835 and 1837. Even then, Upton was 
obliged to give his parole not to return to Russia. He remained a prisoner of war until his 
claim for the allowances due to him prompted his release. Thanks presumably to Arthur 
Kinnaird, a keen supporter of Palmerston, the prime minister granted Upton an interview. But 
his attempts to secure full compensation nevertheless failed. General Evans, ‘strongly of 
opinion’ that Upton had ‘been treated altogether very unfairly’, offered in January 1856 to 
support a campaign in parliament. Upton, however, shunned publicity. As he pointed out to a 
friend, ‘if the Russian authorities were aware that I had given any information to the English; 
they might be induced to stop my mother’s pension’.144 
Upton’s dilemma helps to explain a widespread contemporary perception that 
naturalized Russian subjects were both compromised by their relationship with the tsar and 
unjustly rewarded by it. The most conspicuous beneficiaries of that relationship were the 
Bairds. From the outset, they had profited from attention to contractual detail and their ability 
to manipulate Russian regulations. But they can hardly have failed to resort to the sorts of 
informal practice that prompted the suggestion in 1805 that the firm’s founder was already 
‘intimately acquainted with the proper mode of applying the Key to the private Doors of the 
Chief-Officers in most of the Govt Departments’.145 Even the adulatory Turnerelli wondered 
whether it was fair for Francis Baird to trump his commercial rivals thanks to the tsar’s 
personal favour.146 The greatest resentments, however, were experienced by those who 
incurred substantial losses as a result of their loyalties to the Crown. ‘It will be very hard to 
lose all this on account of War as a British Subject’, Alexander Lawrie complained, ‘for had I 
become a Russian Subject it would not have been the case’.147 No-one felt a keener sense of 
injustice than William Whitworth, who received only ‘paltry’ travelling expenses when the 
Foreign Office took up his case after the war at the behest of the Radical M.P. for 
Manchester, Thomas Milner Gibson. Though Wodehouse repeatedly pressed Whitworth’s 
claim for compensation, conscious of its significance as a precedent, the Russian government 
maintained that they had been ‘fully justified’ in detaining British subjects who had been 
employed in docks and arsenals. ‘Should another war take place’, Whitworth sourly 
observed, ‘I am sure that every Englishman in the Russian Service will continue in it, rather 
than meet certain ruin both to himself and his family’.148 In January 1857, he went further, 
issuing a public ‘warning to any of our countrymen at present in Russia or considering going 
there’: 
If I had remained in the Russian service, as, for instance, Mr. Baird of St. Petersburg 
and one or two others did, I should, I grant, have been a traitor, but by the terms of the 
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Treaty of Paris a pardoned one; and I should now have been at home with some 
3,000l. in hand, instead of having sacrificed 1,200l., to say nothing about the anxiety 
and annoyance of being detained in Moscow. In truth, the four or five individuals who 
were detained under somewhat similar circumstances, and did what they ought to do, 
are made to suffer, while the traitor is pardoned by the English Government, and 
liberally rewarded by the Russians.149  
Technically, this was incorrect. Though a Russian subject dependent on government 
contracts, Francis Baird had never been in Russian service. Nevertheless, the proclamation of 
8 February 1855 had made him a traitor and the perception persisted that it was risky to deal 
with him. When he ordered two marine engines from Greenwich in autumn 1856, the 
manufacturers, presuming that Baird intended to replace machinery seized in 1854, thought it 
prudent to ask the Admiralty whether they should undertake the work. Approving their 
‘proper’ inquiry, Clarendon ruefully confirmed that his government was powerless to 
intervene.150 All Orders in Council proscribing trade with Russia had been annulled at the end 
of the war. Free to resume his business, Baird went from strength to strength, being decorated 
for his Crimean service in 1857 and again in the following year when St Isaac’s was finally 
consecrated. By meeting the testing requirements of the Russian navy, he became the fourth 
largest employer in St Petersburg by 1862 with a workforce of 15 master craftsmen, 750 adult 
labourers and 100 children under fifteen.151 Though Francis Baird died suddenly in March 
1864, a month after returning from his daughter’s London funeral, his firm remained in the 
hands of his grandson, George, until he sold out to French interests in 1881, a decade after 
enrolling in the Russian nobility.152 
 
Post-war allegiances: British residents in Russia, 1856-1870 
Though Lohr was puzzled by the spike in rates of naturalization in 1857, when 37 per cent of 
immigrants are recorded as having become Russian subjects, part of the explanation lies in 
the widespread belief that only naturalized Russians would prosper after the war.153 That 
perception was boosted in autumn 1856 when it emerged that the new Black Sea Steamship 
Navigation Company, subsidized by the government and sponsored by the Grand Duke 
Konstantin Nikolaevich, was ‘to be entirely composed of Russian Subjects on the ground that 
great part of the business will consist of trade between Russian ports’.154 The government’s 
determination to switch from foreign purchase to domestic construction of ironclad ships also 
benefited naturalized Russian subjects. No sooner had the war ended than one of them, the 
British merchant banker Matthew Carr, resident in Russia for more than twenty years, 
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founded in May 1856 a partnership with Mark MacPherson, who had served as engineer on 
the imperial yacht in 1852-53. Though they, too, learned the hard way about the rigidity of 
Russian contractual demands, their shipyard on Vasilʹevskii Island, still a going concern as 
the Baltiiskii zavod, rapidly came to compete with the Baird Works for government orders. In 
1861, Carr and Macpherson won the contract for the Opyt, the first ironclad gunboat built in 
Russia, and in 1866, two years after the death of Francis Baird, who had initially outbid them 
for engines, they came in ‘significantly lower’ than his grandson in the tender for the frigate 
Minin.155 William Crichton’s gamble on his Russian future also proved justified in the longer 
term. In the 1860s, he not only took control of the Cowie yards at Åbo but bought more of his 
own in the Okhta district of St Petersburg. Both enterprises were still thriving at his death in 
1884. Indeed, as late as 1911, French investment analysts predicted that the ageing Crichton 
shipyards on the Neva would attract a healthy order book if only they could be rebuilt to meet 
the requirements of a modern navy.156 
Whitworth’s warning nevertheless fell on increasingly deaf ears as Russian tariffs 
came down in 1857, Britain signed a new trade treaty in January 1859 permitting a new 
generation of British subjects to arrive in Russia with no intention of naturalizing, and 
Russia’s naval reforms continued to rely on foreign expertise well into the 1860s.157 Even 
some of the British residents most directly unsettled by the war were keen to return at its end. 
The only prominent figure to experience difficulty was Charles Bell, who learned, on 
applying for a passport in April 1856, that a mark had been placed against his name by the 
secret police. Wodehouse was surprised to discover the reason why. Unable to secure the 
prompt release of his brother, an engineer arrested on board an Egyptian steamer in the Black 
Sea soon after Russia went to war with the Ottoman Empire, Bell had taken ‘the imprudent 
step of writing in strong terms to the Grand Duchess Marie’, inviting her to close her account 
with Thomson Bonar. Nicholas I understandably took offence, ‘and as Mr Bell was already 
on the black list of the police on account of the part taken by him in the secession of English 
from the English Club some years ago [in 1842], and from his conversation on political 
topics, the Russian Government determined not to allow [him] to return to Russia after the 
war’.158 But these were more optimistic days, symbolized by Dubelʹt’s retirement from the 
Third Section, and Wodehouse had secured a passport for Bell by the end of July. In Warsaw, 
Douglas Evans was soon collaborating with Charles Vignoles on a £360,000 bid to replace 
decrepit pontoons across the Vistula with a road and rail bridge.159 Though that bid failed, the 
Evans brothers remained in control of their firm until their retirement in the mid-1860s, when 
it passed into the hands of Lilpop, Rau and Loewenstein. James Stuart Rees apparently settled 
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in Kiev province, where his Russian wife gave birth to a daughter, Olga, in 1876.160 The 
Russia Company paid for the widow of one of its members, ‘compelled to quit Russia on 
account of the late war’, to return there because she had failed to find employment as a 
teacher in Britain.161 Evicted from Lithuania, even the St Clair family kept its interests in 
Warsaw, where Edmund Bower St Clair became vice-consul in 1900.162  
By 1870, both the tsarist and British governments had moved to alleviate some of the 
problems of allegiance that plagued them in the Crimean War. Though Alexander II 
continued, to the perceived disadvantage of British merchants, to offer varying immunities to 
different ‘foreign guests’, he promulgated in 1864 an edict that ‘embodied a conceptual shift 
toward the creation of a single, generic, unified citizenship’ by making naturalized Russian 
subjects equal to natural-born subjects in the eyes of the law.163 Six years later, the British 
Naturalization Acts of 1870 released from their obligations to the queen all those who had 
voluntarily naturalized abroad. As they learned from a characteristically incisive pamphlet by 
their consul, Thomas Michell, British residents in Russia now faced an unprecedentedly stark 
choice: either to abandon their British nationality, and with it the right to British diplomatic 
protection, or to remain a British subject with all the obligations that entailed. For those of 
fighting age, the dilemma was especially acute, though crucial ambiguities relating to others 
remained unresolved: it would, Michell warned, be ‘difficult to define all the cases in which 
the acts of a British Subject who continued to serve the Russian Government during a war 
with Great Britain would be considered treasonable’.164  
Those with long memories like the Kronstadt-born Michell knew that armed conflict 
generated multiple opportunities for betrayal.165 In 1855, the year in which Michell began his 
career as translator and interpreter to Russian prisoners of war at Lewes, the British 
government branded as traitors those naturalized Russian subjects who contracted to 
manufacture engines for Russian warships, and it regarded the Russian government’s refusal 
to release unwilling British artisans as a breach of the belligerents’ agreement to guarantee 
the protection and security of their respective domiciles. Consonant with the nature of a war 
in which ‘diplomacy had only occasionally been interrupted by battles’, the British 
government arguably devoted as much care to these few vulnerable individuals as it spared 
for the thousands of its troops languishing in the Crimea.166 The Russian government, on the 
other hand, maintained that all those British residents in its service who failed to leave at the 
beginning of the war were bound to serve its interests thereafter and it refused to release 
military engineers whose knowledge could be turned against the tsar. One such specialist, 
William Upton, undoubtedly betrayed Russian secrets, even if he could reasonably claim that 
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the British Army reneged on its promises to compensate him for so doing; another, William 
Whitworth, resented the sacrifices he made to preserve his allegiance to the queen while 
Francis Baird had profited from his loyalty to the tsar. Taken as a whole, these conflicted 
loyalties suggest that the Crimean War should no longer be regarded as a mere ripple on the 
surface of the history of the British community in Russia. Instead, it merits recognition as an 
unusually illuminating instance of the complexities of British government policy toward 
British residents abroad, and of the paradoxes of Russian government policy toward 
foreigners in the era before systematic persecution of ‘enemy aliens’ began.  
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